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ABSTRACT
Translucency is now a common design element in at least one
popular mobile operating system. This raises security con-
cerns as it can make it harder for users to correctly identify
and interpret trusted interaction elements. In this paper,
we demonstrate this security problem using the example of
the Safari browser in the latest iOS version on Apple tablets
and phones (iOS7), and discuss technical challenges of an
attack as well as solutions to these challenges. We conclude
with a survey-based user study, where we seek to quantify
the security impact, and find that further investigation is
warranted.
1. INTRODUCTION
Graphic design has gone through many phases through-
out history. Over the last century we have seen (among
others) expressionism, avant garde, modernism, and post-
modernism, followed by what could be called “contempo-
rary” design. User interface (UI) design can also be seen
as consisting of several distinct visual styles over the field’s
history. Initially there were physical buttons and printers
for output. This moved to terminals, where things went
from command line, to single windows, to overlapping win-
dows, and back to non-overlapping interfaces with new mo-
bile interfaces. A distinct trend in recent years that can
be observed is that of “flat” design, whereby the fake shad-
ows and crystal buttons of the Web 2.0 graphical movement
have been replaced by something slimmed down, and less
“metaphoric”. One place where this can be seen is in “the
great flattening” of the iOS7 interface from Apple.
As graphical power has grown in recent years, Apple has
added transparency effects to iOS7. This graphical power
enabled, among others, the parallax effect and layered translu-
cency. In the Safari iOS7 web browser this translucency is
also implemented, as shown in Figure 4.
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Figure 1: Example of an underlay attack
In this paper we present an attack that may enhance
phishing attacks (Section 2), which is based on this trans-
parency effect. We tested our attack using a crowdsourced
experiment, and find that a larger study or an improved at-
tack with larger effect is needed to find conclusive evidence
of a threat (Section 3). Based on some further exploratory
work we provide proposals for the design of trusted user
interfaces (Section 5). Our contributions are:
• identifying the potential problems that underlay at-
tacks can cause,
• evaluating the impact of such an attack in a major
smartphone and tablet operating system,
• running a usable security study on multiple crowd-
sourcing platforms.
2. THE UNDERLAY ATTACK
Using the code in Figure 2 we were able to create a proof
of concept for the attack. The result is shown in Figure 5.
The code is specifically aimed at the iPad’s landscape mode,
and doesn’t include a copy of a target website yet. For an
actual attack, it would be trivial for the attacker to include
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Figure 2: The underlay attack exposed
Figure 3: Illustration of the attack idea
the authentic website in an IFRAME, detect the orientation
and respond dynamically, and integrate password capture
mechanisms. Figure 1 shows an example of what a real
attack could look like.
Given that the colour green is widely used in secure user
interfaces we expected that this would cause more people to
fall for phishing. If the user were to scroll up in the page then
the green bar would become visible and the deceipt would
be obvious. However there are technical ways to prevent
this from happening. The details of such an implementation
are a technicality and therefore we did not concern ourselves
with this for the purpose of this study.
Translucency can be a visually appealing design element.
However, this may come at the cost of decreased security.
Yee [1] provides guidelines for secure user interaction de-
sign. The paper states, among other things that interfaces
should represent objects and actions using unspoofable rep-
Figure 4: Demonstration of transparency in iOS7
Figure 5: Our proof of concept for the attack
resentations. When an attacker-controlled UI element is pre-
sented underneath a trustworthy but transparent element,
this gives the attacker limited control over the trustworthy
element. Yee also states that authority relationships that
would affect security-relevant decisions should be easily re-
viewable in the interface. From controlling a trustworthy
UI element it is not a long way to spoofing system security
marks. Attacks always get better, they never get worse.
Transparency is used throughout the user interface design
in Apple’s current iOS operating system for iPad tablets.
The included web browser in iOS is Safari. One noteworthy
instance of transparency design is the browser’s address bar.
Using colouring in the address bar is an emerging trend
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<style >
.green {
width: 100%;
min -height: 200px;
background -color: #88 ff00;
}
</style >
...
<div class="green">&nbsp;</div >
<div id="high">
...
</div >
<a name="login">&nbsp;</a>
<script >
document.getElementById(’high ’).style.height =
window.innerHeight - 45;
var anchor = "#login";
if (location.hash != anchor) {
location.href = location.pathname + anchor;
}
</script >
Figure 6: Attack code (CSS, HTML, JavaScript)
for indicating SSL certificate information and other secu-
rity aspects of a connected website. As illustrated in Figure
1, the colour of Safari’s address bar depends in part on the
colour of the web page loaded underneath. An attack is then
straightforward: direct the browser to a page that automat-
ically scrolls, such that a big green-coloured area is placed
directly underneath the address bar.
Besides trying to increase trustworthiness of the website
though a coloured underlay, other avenues for attack may
be possible, such as trying to make the URL harder to read
by decreasing the contrast of the URL bar.
3. EVALUATION OF THREAT LEVEL
Our research question was can subversion of the interface
via translucent elements lead to negative security effects? To
test whether our attack presents a concrete threat we per-
formed a study on two crowdsourcing platforms.
We were interested in comparing the effectiveness of the
phishing attacks. So we considered three hypotheses: For
each two types of screenshots (authentic, green, plain) we
tested whether one type is more trustworthy than the other,
and did this for all combinations.
H1. For a simple random sample, participants are likely to
respond differently to a plain phishing attack site than
to the original site. This hypothesis states the expecta-
tion that end-users can distinguish phishing sites from
authentic sites if asked to. We use this hypothesis as
motivation for the other hypotheses – if a user can-
not detect a phishing attack then improving upon the
attack will not have a useful effect.
H2. For a simple random sample, participants are likely to
respond differently to a green-bar attack site than to a
plain attack site. This hypothesis states that end-users
are more likely to fall for the green-bar attack.
H3. For a simple random sample, participants are likely to
respond differently to a green-bar attack site than to
the original site. This hypothesis states that end-users
are still likely to detect green-bar attacks.
Bank of America Google Mail
Authentic with EV-SSL Authentic with SSL
bankofamerica.com accounts.google.com
Fraud with green bar Fraud with green bar
bankofarnerica.com google-rnail.com
Fraud without green bar Fraud without green bar
bankofarnerica.com google-rnail.com
Figure 7: iPad screenshots used in the survey
Note that the hypotheses are two-tailed and we do not
test for direction.
While creating the sample screenshots we determined the
following control variables:
• URL (between phishing attacks)
• Page body
• System clock
• Carrier
• Wi-Fi signal strength
• Battery level
To study the above hypotheses we made the following as-
sumptions:
• We are able to select users at random from a general
population.
• The decision whether a given user is willing to enter
personal information on a given web page depends only
on what is displayed, i.e. is a function of the screen.
• Users are able to accurately predict their decision for
a given screen from only a screenshot.
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We concluded from this that for a fixed web page, the
decision for a randomly picked user whether or not to enter
their personal information is distributed i.i.d. (independent
and identically distributed) Bernoulli and is a function of
the selected user.
3.1 Particpants
We recruited 3001 participants from Google’s Customer
Surveys platform, and 73 participants from CrowdFlower’s
platform. Each participant was paid depending on the plat-
form. CrowdFlower workers were paid up to $ 0.20, and
Google participants earned various benefits on the Google
platform.
For the CrowdFlower study participants were randomly
split between 6 groups. Each group was shown one of the
screenshots in Figure 7, and participants were also presented
with an anti-spam question. We also collected various back-
ground statistics about participants such as geo-location in-
formation.
We ran the intitial study on CrowdFlower with the in-
tention of having 600 participants. However, we had a very
small number of respondents per hour. Then we ran the
study on Google Consumer Surveys with 3000 participants.
After the results were in we started further exploratory sur-
veys to investigate effects that may have impacted the study.
3.2 Study design
We used two crowdsourcing platforms for this study: Crowd-
Flower and Google Consumer Surveys. As these platforms
placed different restraints on the survey we had a different
setup for each.
3.2.1 CrowdFlower
The CrowdFlower screen contained the following descrip-
tion:
Image Categorization
Let us know whether this website is safe based
on the screenshot provided.
Thank You! Your careful attention on this task
is greatly appreciated!
We showed the screenshot and asked the following ques-
tion:
Is this website safe?
Available answers were“Yes”and“No.” In order to counter
bias, we randomised the order of the answers through a
JavaScript function in the CrowdFlower job.The Crowd-
Flower pa randomized the order of the answers to counter
bias.
As alternatives for wording the question we considered
among others:
• Do you trust this site?
• Would you login at this site?
However, each of these places inappropriate emphasis on
aspects that are not related to connection security. For ex-
ample, site trust would be significantly influenced by brand
awareness. A user would also be more likely to respond pos-
itively to the login question if there is a prior relationship
and the user has an account at that site with which to login.
Figure 8: The CrowdFlower survey page with ques-
tions
Figure 9: The Google Consumers Survey
To filter out automated (bot) submissions and ensure a
minimum level of participant attentiveness, we asked a triv-
ial control question:
What day of the week is it?
We validated the response against a list of reasonable
strings. We did not deem it necessary verify that the system-
recorded timestamp corresponded to the entered weekday.
In addition to the questions that participants were asked
to fill out, the CrowdFlower system automatically collected
start/finish times for us. This allowed us to do a spot sanity
check on time taken.
The CrowdFlower system automatically prevents multiple
submissions from a single participant under the configura-
tion that we had set up. We were not able to filter out
participants from previous trial runs so we simply discarded
their entries using the unique identifier.
3.2.2 Google Consumer Surveys
For Google Consumer Surveys we adapted the Crowd-
Flower job, due to several technical and economic constraints.
Google Consumer Surveys limited image size to 300 by 250
pixels. Hence we created iPhone screenshots instead of iPad
screenshots and cut them off at the proportionate level. See
figure 10 for these screenshots. Due to an oversight the ques-
tion on the Google platform was “Is this website secure?”
instead of “Is this website safe?”.
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Bank of America Google Mail
Authentic with EV-SSL Authentic with SSL
bankofamerica.com accounts.google.com
Fraud with green bar Fraud with green bar
bankofarnerica.com google-rnail.com
Fraud without green bar Fraud without green bar
bankofarnerica.com google-rnail.com
Figure 10: iPhone screenshots used in the survey
Google Consumer Surveys also required significant extra
payment per response to ask a second question (1000 % over
the price for one question). We thus did not include a bot
control question and instead included an extra answer op-
tion: “I’m not a human” in the Yes/No question.
Finally, Google Consumer Surveys did not allow for a sur-
vey title nor description.
See the Section 8 for more details about the materials used
in this study.
3.3 Results
The data that we collected are summarised in Tables 1,
2, 3, and 4. We did not analyse the CrowdFlower data due
to low volume. Note that we do not discuss the exploratory
questions in this section, but that we will discuss these later.
We tested the null hypotheses that there is pairwise no
difference in trustworthiness. To do this we totalled the
data over the sites Google Mail and Bank of America. We
then ran Fisher’s exact test and applied a Bonferri correction
(factor 3) to account for family-wise error. The two-tailed
p-values are summarized in Table 5.
By making additional assumptions on the Google Con-
sumer Survey responses we were able to apply a correction
to account for the bot responses. Specifically we assumed
that bots (and unattentive human participants) chose at
Table 2: Corrected sample proportions, per cate-
gory
B-of-A Gmail Overall
Authentic 0.45 0.71 0.58
Fraud with green bar 0.29 0.42 0.35
Fraud with plain bar 0.29 0.38 0.34
Overall 0.34 0.50 0.42
Table 3: Sample population, per category
CrowdFlower B-of-A Google Mail
∑
Authentic 9 10 19
Fraud with green bar 18 13 31
Fraud with plain bar 7 16 23∑
34 39 73
random between the possibilities. That is, bot responses
are distributed i.i.d. U{Y,N, ε} where U is the uniform dis-
tribution.
Under these assumptions the best estimate for the human
responses when we measured (Y,N, ε) was:
(Yˆ ′, Nˆ ′) = (Y − ε,N − ε)
So we subtracted the “I’m not a human” response count
from the “Yes” count and its triple from the sample pop-
ulation prior to summing across the sites and running the
statistical tests.
The test we used is not exact because of this procedure,
but it works in an approximative fashion, for a signal-to-
noise ratio approaching one (for (Y +N)/(Y +N+ε) small).
For a descriptive view of the data, we computed the confi-
dence intervals at α = 0.05 and α = 0.01 for the sample pro-
portion per type. We used the normal approximation which
was appropriate because Y,N  5 in all cases. These inter-
vals as well as the observed sample proportions are shown
in Figure 6.
We also calculated effect size in the form of a pairwise
odds ratio. This is shown in Figure 7.
4. DISCUSSION OF THREAT LEVEL
4.1 Hypothesis Tests
The survey data support H1 with statistical significance.
We can then conclude that end-users can in fact detect
phishing when they are asked about site security. The study
of more effective phishing attacks is therefore motivated. We
were also able to confirm H3 which states that end-users can
still detect the underlay green-bar phishing attack. While
Table 4: Response of “secure”, per category
CrowdFlower B-of-A Google Mail
∑
Authentic 7 9 16
Fraud with green bar 11 7 18
Fraud with plain bar 7 14 21∑
25 30 55
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Table 1: Google Consumer Survey responses, per category
B-of-A Gmail
∑
Y N ε Pop Y N ε Pop Y N ε Pop
Authentic 208 242 53 503 286 152 62 500 494 394 115 1003
Fraud with green bar 151 301 49 501 191 242 63 496 342 543 112 997
Fraud with plain bar 153 296 51 500 182 261 58 501 335 557 109 1001∑
512 839 153 1504 659 655 183 1497 1171 1494 336 3001
Table 5: Corrected two-tailed p-values, by pair
Green Authentic Authentic
versus versus versus
Plain Green Plain
p-value 0.64 < 10−15 < 10−15
Corrected ≥ 1 < 10−14 < 10−14
Table 6: Confidence intervals, by type
u(X) u(X) pˆ v(X) v(X)
α 0.01 0.05 0.05 0.01
Authentic 0.51 0.54 0.58 0.61 0.63
Green 0.30 0.31 0.35 0.38 0.40
Plain 0.29 0.30 0.34 0.37 0.38
we did not test direction in the statistical tests the sample
proportions and confidence intervals clearly show the direc-
tion of the effects.
Unfortunately we were not able to confirm H2 so it is not
clear that our attack in this variant was effective. A larger
sample size and/or an improved attack with larger effect
size would be necessary to confirm this. The sample odds
ratio was only 1.06 (with a 95 % confidence interval of 0.84
to 1.34) so the attack does not appear to be a significant
improvement in this variant.
Our results warrant further investigation. We have started
several exploratory studies to quantitatively measure the ef-
fect of the many aspects in which the attack can be varied.
Section 4.3 goes into more detail of preliminary findings of
these investigations.
4.2 Interpretation of Results
We suspect that in the context of the survey the green
colouring may have drawn the participant’s attention to the
URL. Participants may have interpreted the green colouring
as a highlight or emphasis, which may have pointed them to
the URL bar as an area to pay attention to and base their
decision on. We may thus have caused participants to read
the URL, when they normally would not have done so even
Table 7: Odds ratio, by pair
Green Plain
Authentic 2.54 2.69
Green 1.06
in the plain phishing screenshot. This would seem unlikely
to happen during typical web browsing.
Previous studies by other authors have shown that end-
users tend not to look at the address bar to verify that they
are browsing a trusted website [2]. Then the purpose of
testing an alternative presentation might be unclear. How-
ever instead of simply subverting the original indicator we
are in fact attempting to create a false indicator that could
hint that the website in question is safe. While the end-
user might not consciously recognize the indicator there is a
chance that the user subconsciously responds to it.
One way to explain our results is that the human mind
functions as a prediction engine. It might be that users have
certain expectations, and if something is suddenly there that
wasn’t there before, or if it doesn’t serve as an affirmative
signal, it will serve as an attention trigger. This indicates
that salience of trust indicators may play a role, i.e. only
those that are actually seen by the user will be considered.
For phishers this indicates that they shouldn’t draw atten-
tion if they don’t have to, and for engineers of browsers that
they should do more to make security (and insecurity) indi-
cators more salient. These and various improvements to our
attack are possible, and we discuss possible future work in
Section 7.
Note that in our survey we overlooked some variables be-
fore running the study such as the lock icon to indicate a
secured connection. This may have adversely affected our
results. In the future a different methodology might be ap-
propriate such as comparing the screenshots using an“image
diff” software to verify that no variables are overlooked.
4.3 Exploratory Investigations
After the primary study we ran several short runs of adapted
interfaces. This exploratory investigation looked at the ef-
fect of the question we asked as well as several factors on
the authentic screenshots. We performed the following short
surveys:
“Safe” We tested the green and plain attacks but asked “Is
this website safe?” This was to explore the effect of a
slightly different question.
Mismatching EV We presented a screenshot with the Bank
of America EV but the Google Mail content to test
whether users actually read the EV information or only
notice whether an EV is displayed. The screenshot we
used is shown in Figure 11.
Authentic without lock We showed the authentic screen-
shot but without lock. This tests the effect of the pad-
lock icon. The screenshot can be seen in Figure 12.
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Figure 11: Mismatching EV screenshot
Figure 12: Variants of the authentic screenshot
Authentic with green bar Similar to the underlay green-
bar attack we presented the authentic site with a green
address bar. This was to complement our original sur-
vey results. This screenshot is also included in Figure
12.
The survey results are shown in Table 8.
Varying the question did not appear to have any effect.
We observed sample proportions of 0.40 vs. 0.42 (odds ratio:
1.09) and 0.36 vs. 0.38 (OR: 1.09).
The mismatching EV on Google Mail appears to be no-
ticeable enough (0.52 vs. 0.71, OR: 2.26). However it per-
forms better than the green attack (0.42, OR: 1.50) and
better than the plain attack (0.38, OR: 1.77). Interestingly
the mismatching EV appears to perform better than the
authentic Bank of America screenshot at 0.45 (OR: 1.32).
Of note, the green variant of the authentic Gmail website
appears to perform worse than the original authentic screen-
shot (0.61 vs. 0.71, OR: 1.57). We suspect that this may be
due to users recalling the look of the original authentic site
on their own devices and noticing that it does not look the
the same. The typical security indicators are present but
this might not be enough to sway the user after they have
noticed the difference.
Removing the lock from the authentic screenshot appears
to have a great effect on user response. Without a padlock
icon the screenshot performs at 0.48 compared to the original
0.71 (OR: 2.65).
Table 8: Results of the explorative surveys
Y N ε Yˆ ′ Nˆ ′ pˆ
Mismatching EV 83 79 25 58 54 0.52
“Safe” green 65 97 17 48 72 0.40
“Safe” plain 72 108 21 51 87 0.36
Authentic green 86 66 32 54 34 0.61
Authentic w/out lock 81 85 28 53 57 0.48
4.4 Limitations
Throughout the survey design and execution we encoun-
tered limitations both inherent in the survey method and in-
duced by the specific crowd-sourcing platform that we used.
Below we provide further details about these limitations.
Other researchers are encouraged to verify, as there are
likely various hidden biases present in the study. We lower
the barrier to others to verify our findings in different set-
tings and using different methods as all our materials are
made available under open access. We agree that there are
still no widely agreed-upon standards for sharing study de-
signs, so the study will need to be ported to the specific
platform on which it is run.
4.4.1 Representativeness of Materials
An important aspect is the question of how representa-
tive the materials are. This is often a tougher question than
sample representativeness, especially when only investigat-
ing the difference between treatments. For example: We
haven’t looked a safari’s private browsing mode, which uses
something like darkened glass effect. Additionally, we’ve
looked at something like frosted glass, and it could be that
there are interfaces that are much more transparent.
4.4.2 Concerns around Quality of Responses
We tried to keep the survey short and quick to complete
for participants. Having only a single real question and a
trivial bot control question does not necessarily ensure a
high level of attentiveness. However, note that for inves-
tigations into phishing the application of an attentiveness
check to filter participants is likely to filter out those that
are more likely to fall for phishing.
Google Consumer Surveys showed a non-negligible level
of responses with “I’m not a human.” We were not able to
determine whether this was due to bot submissions or lack
of attentiveness. The problem of distinguishing bots from
non-attentive humans is a general problem in crowdsourced
research. For future work we intend to run lab studies along-
side crowdsourced studies. Due to an increased noise floor,
there is a need to scale up the number of respondents in
crowdsourced studies. In addition there is also the require-
ment to scale sideways: to run studies on multiple platforms,
and preferably to run studies both on- and offline.
With only a Boolean yes/no response it is hard to tell
whether people have correctly interpreted the question. The
satisfaction survey suggests that the instructions were con-
sidered clear by participants. However, it is doubtful that
a misunderstanding would be detected by enough partici-
pants. Note that the answers in the bot question on Crowd-
Flower indicate that the participants there read the ques-
tions, but that this does not say anything about the clarity
and interpretation of the question about website trustwor-
thiness. In future work a sanity check in the form of a dedi-
cated attention-check question is appropriate on the Google
Consumer Surveys platform. Additionally, open-ended an-
swers asking how a question is interpreted are appropriate.
Unfortunately it is a common technique on some crowd-
sourcing sites to perform automated submissions for per-
sonal gain. This leaves survey authors with invalid or useless
submissions. To counter this we implemented a bot check.
Unfortunately this bot check can filter out real participants
if they are not attentive enough or simply by chance due to
mismatching answer formats.
7
Google Consumer Surveys did not allow us to ask a bot
control question as described earlier.
4.4.3 Concerns around Technology
CrowdFlower doesn’t directly support surveys split into
groups or with randomised answer ordering. We had to im-
plement this using client-side JavaScript code. Then for
choosing a random screenshot to show to the participant we
had to rely on the browser’s built-in random number gener-
ator. This may have impacted on random assignment into
groups. Additionally, CrowdFlower didn’t allow us to pre-
vent duplicates across test runs vs. actual runs and this
means we had to take out around a fifth of the final data.
Lastly, as shown by Renkema et al [3], we cannot be sure
that CrowdFlower is running their infrastructure properly
(or any other crowdsourcing provider for that matter).
Google’s platform did not allow us to start several surveys
simultaneously and did not allow random assignment within
a survey. In part this was due to an intransparent survey
review process that introduced delay between the time of
survey scheduling and the actual starting time. As time
of day among other things can affect the participants’ at-
tentiveness this may have unnecessarily biased some groups
and affected the outcome. Another possible source of bias
is adaptive targeting (whereby Google Consumer Surveys
appears to have directed the surveys towards different audi-
ences), which likely introduced further unknown bias.
Generally, the crowdsourcing platforms are very opague.
The review process for Google Consumer Surveys was also
intransparent with respect to which surveys they allowed
and which they didn’t. In one instance the exact same sur-
vey with a slightly adapted image was rejected even though
ten other similar surveys were accepted. After making a
change with no effect and resubmitting the survey it was
accepted.
4.5 Ethics
During the data collection various demographics were au-
tomatically included by Google. For CrowdFlower we en-
abled the option of saving the browser agent identifier as
well as the IP address. We chose to save these to enable
checking of double submissions. For opening of the data (see
Section 8) we have opted to remove the IP addresses and to
anonymise the user IDs for both platforms. We expect the
participant terms of use of these crowdsourcing platforms to
account for this.
There was no informed consent from the participants.
However, we assumed implicit consent for non-harmful tasks,
given that the participants working on a crowdsourcing plat-
form. Our surveys did not provide a debrief informing the
participants of the purpose of the study, and as such partic-
ipants were not made aware of deception. This was largely
due to technical limitations in the platforms available to us,
as well as the nature of crowdsourcing. Given the nature of
crowdsourcing, participants are not likely to read any debrief
text.
We think that there is no likely harm from participating
in the study, and it might even help people in becoming
slightly more aware of web security. Also, participants in
the CrowdFlower platform were able to take part in a sat-
isfaction survey to rate their experience with the original
survey. We do not have access to the raw survey data but
the summary statistics show a satisfaction level of at least
4 out of 5 in the categories “Overall”, “Instructions Clear”,
“Ease Of Job” and “Pay.”
5. PROPOSED SOLUTION
In the interest of responsible disclosure we make Apple
aware of the problem after we carried out the user study and
before publication, and recommend them to remove trans-
parency in iOS7 Safari. While this will take away some
of the “eye candy” of the interface, it will ensure that the
attack presented in this paper is no longer possible. Alter-
natively, on first displaying a new page, the URL bar could
be made opaque and only becoming transparent after some
time. This would not provide complete protection, but it
could provide an acceptable compromise between seduction
and security.
Additionally we encourage all browser vendors, for both
desktop and mobile web browsers, to come together and
agree on common standards for displaying trust indicators.
Standards for secure interfaces are sorely lacking. We expect
that one factor that contributes to the difficulty of distin-
guishing a fake from a genuine trust indicator is the current
wide variety of trust signals.
6. RELATEDWORK
Security systems are known to fail due to human factors
[4]. This is the same for phishing [5], and this is what our
attack builds on. We have presented a hybrid attack that
combines both technical shortcomings with limitations in
human capabilities.
As mentioned by Yee [1], user interface elements should
not provide control to an attacker. The attack that we
have discovered does just this: we achieve limited control
of the user interface to influence the way that trust indi-
cators are displayed. What is enabled by our approach is
twofold: spoofing security indicators, and making insecu-
rity indicators harder to perceive. Following an econometric
analysis, Herley [6] suggests that users don’t check security
indicators because the real costs are greater than possibly
damages. While users would be unlikely to make such exten-
sive calculations, we can safely assume that they make some
cost-benefit analysis when exposed to various technologies.
We use this propensity in our attack scenario, by seeking to
make checking of security indicators as difficult as possible.
Conti et al [7] describe attacks against security systems
based on visual overload, and also describe the need for
countermeasures against malicious interfaces [8]. The litera-
ture describes various malicous interface methods that go in
a similar direction to ours. Related attacks are clickjacking
[9], UI redressing, and mousejacking.
An attack that also depends on relocation of the page is
the URL spoofing attack from Dhanjani [10]. Instead of
trying to change the authentic URL, Dhanjani creates a vi-
sually identical copy of the URL bar in the iPhone interface.
Gabrilovich and Gontmakher [11] describe a way of spoofing
characters using look-alike glyphs from the Unicode charac-
ter set. Krammer [12] describes a possible countermeasure
for this based on highlighting. In transluscent interfaces
such highlighting might be circumvented using the underlay
attack that we have presented.
Lin et al [13] have described URL highlighting as a mech-
anism that has a protective effect in certain cases. Again,
our technique might be able to reduce it’s effectiveness when
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transparent interfaces are present. Another countermea-
sures that depends on visualisation are visual fingerprints
[14] based on hash visualisation [15], which is also possible
circumvented by our underlay attack.
Attacks such as those presented here illustrate the need for
trusted windowing systems such as EROS by Shapiro et al
[16]. However, this is not likely to happen in the near future.
Others have shown the sorry state of security indicators and
security warnings on the web. Stebila [17] found many web-
sites abusing trust indicators. Schechter et al [2] found that
security indicators were generally ineffective. Jakobsson [18]
found that padlock indicators had little effect on trust. Am-
rutkar et al [19] performed a usability analysis of indicators
in web browsers, and found them severly lacking.
7. CONCLUSION
We have highlighted the danger of transparency in user
interfaces, and have presented an attack on iOS7 Safari.
We have conducted an evaluation of the attack on a crowd-
sourcing platform, and we found that further investigation
is needed.
Various avenues for future work are open:
• Testing which colour works best. An attacker could do
this adaptively using, for example, A/B testing [20] or
Bandit based methods [21].
• Testing phishing URLs by running them through a
crowdsourcing survey platform.
• Testing phishing email content using crowdsourcing.
• Investigating whether the ideal colour is site-specific.
• Investigating the possibility of defeating the blurring
mask to present security indicators.
• Making phishing URL harder to distinguish, e.g by
camouflaging the misspellings using reduced contrast,
distracting patterns or by derailing attention towards
less suspicious UI elements
Through these avenues we can explore opportunities for
user confusion. Bravo-Lillo et al [22] have advocated the
design of “attractors” in order to direct the user’s attention
towards relevant aspects of security warnings. We propose
further research into the design of “distractors” that can hin-
der users in interpreting security indicators.
8. OPEN ACCESS
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